Missouri University of Science and Technology

Scholars' Mine
UMR-MEC Conference on Energy
14 Oct 1976

Economic Implications of Alternative Property Rights Systems for
Geothermal Resources
Thomas D. Crocker

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/umr-mec
Part of the Chemical Engineering Commons, and the Energy Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Crocker, Thomas D., "Economic Implications of Alternative Property Rights Systems for Geothermal
Resources" (1976). UMR-MEC Conference on Energy. 202.
https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/umr-mec/202

This Article - Conference proceedings is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars' Mine. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UMR-MEC Conference on Energy by an authorized administrator of Scholars' Mine. This
work is protected by U. S. Copyright Law. Unauthorized use including reproduction for redistribution requires the
permission of the copyright holder. For more information, please contact scholarsmine@mst.edu.

ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE PROPERTY
RIGHTS SYSTEMS FOR GEOTHERMAL RESOURCES*
Thomas D. Crocker
University of Wyoming
Laramie, Wyoming

Abstract
A system of property claims in geothermal steam reservoirs is outlined that
could cause the economically heat energy of the reservoir to be allocated among
claimants and over time in a more efficient fashion. At most, the proposed
scheme is second-best. It is nevertheless realistic.
1.

INTRODUCTION

assimilate information, the suggested scheme seems

The term "geothermal reservoir" may be broadly

applicable in a world of moral compromisors whose

defined as an area on or near the surface of the

capacity to elaborate alternatives and evaluate
consequences is finite.

earth where there naturally exist fluids to which
heat from rocks in the depths of the earth is

It is presumed that the Federal Government or a

being transmitted.

state government has not yet relinquished its semi

In this paper, a system of

property claims in geothermal reservoirs is out

nal proprietary claims to known geothermal reser

lined that could cause the economically valuable

voirs.

heat energy of the reservoir to be allocated among

of nonprice allocation requires the adoption of

However, because it is aware that the use

claimants and over time in a more efficient

nonmarket allocation criteria in order to deal

fashion than "cujus est solum maxim est usque ad

with excess demand, the relevant government is

coclum,"** the rule of capture, or possible geo

supposed to have decided to alter its wealth port

thermal versions of the various regulatory

folio by selling in a competitive auction its

schemes applied to oil, gas, and ground water

rights to each known reservoir.

The exact form of

reservoirs.

the auction need not detain us.

Our interest is

second-best.

At most, the proposed scheme is
Contrary to a great many proposed

solely in shaping the legal claim the government

"efficient" schemes that appear feasible only in

is selling.

Finally, in order to keep the length

a world blessed with tried and true men and women

of the paper under control, I assume that the num

who possess unbounded abilities to acquire and to

ber, in excess of one, of claims sold of any

*This paper is an excerpted and somewhat altered version of a portion of the
report, The Legal and Economic Aspects of Geothermal Development, by Sho Sato
and the above author for NSF Grant // GI-37857.
**This phrase exhausts my knowledge of Latin. Loosely translated, it states
that the common law claim of the overlying landowner extends from heaven to
hell.
***Some readers may consider this assumption insufficiently realistic.
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particular shape is a matter of indifference.
In shaping the claims it is to sell, the govern
ment is anxious that the end result promote eco
nomic efficiency in the use of the geothermal
resource.* This requires that it shape a set of
claims motivating each holder to choose a mix and
magnitude of inputs minimizing the cost of
extracting a given quantity of heat energy from
the reservoir.

These claims must also, from the

prospective of the potential buyer, cause him to
expect to face only small costs in establishing
the nature and the scope of any claim he pur
chases.

This serves to reduce the holder's uncer

tainty, increases the expected value of the claim,
and thereby enhances the holder's incentive to
extend the amount and the duration of his invest
ment in the reservoir to which his claim attaches.
Finally, the set of claims must be structured so
as to minimize the costs of exchange.

will leave insufficient fluid to transmit the heat
energy from the hot rpcks.

the steam phase, increasing reservoir permeability.
Fifth, depending upon the rate of extraction and
recharge, the temperature of extracted fluid may
decrease if the heat is flowing from the hot rocks
to a greater mass of fluid, thereby lowering the
enthalpy of the fluid.

may adversely or beneficially affect a producing
well.

energy extracted within a particular time interval
at this well location is not independent of the
applications of inputs at other well locations in
the same reservoir or perhaps even contiguous
reservoirs.

reservoir is under multiple claims and management
or a single claim and therefore unified management.
If all economically valuable attributes of a
reservoir were embodied in a single claim at the

2. PROBLEMS IN SHAPING ECONOMICALLY EFFICIENT
CLAIMS

time of the government's initial disposal of
claims, and if this claim were to be indivisible,

For geothermal reservoirs, perfection with

the earlier stated criteria for an economically

respect to the immediately preceding criteria

efficient shape of claim would appear to be more-

will be far from easy to achieve, particularly if

or-less fulfilled.

there are multiple claim holders within a single
The reason is that extraction of the

will have one and only one claimant.

not be clear whether two or more adjacent claims

First, since

are in the same or distinct reservoirs.

the reservoir fluid is migratory, one well may

Waiting

to dispose of the government's proprietary rights

Second,

until full information is acquired would fre

one well may cause the fluid to migrate laterally

quently be uneconomic.

This migratory fluid may be

Many geothermal reservoirs

are several thousand acres in size.

colder or hotter than the upward moving fluid

The capital

requirements for exploitation of such an area,

that was being extracted in the latter well.

given the risks inherent in a fairly new technology

Third, with the depletion of the fluid, the

and the relative lack of knowledge about reservoir

enthalpy of the fluid might be increased since
the heat now flows to a lesser mass.

The extent

of each reservoir is imperfectly known and it may

tially to involve several dimensions of recip

toward another well.

However, it seems unlikely for

several reasons that each geothermal reservoir

heat energy from these reservoirs appears poten

drain the fluid away from another well.

The physical and economic nature of

the problem is utterly unaffected by whether the

devote the claim to its highest-valued use.

rocal, nonseparable externalities.

In general, for a particular application of

inputs at one well locat-ion, the incremental heat

will ultimately be held by someone who will

reservoir.

Finally, reinjection of

waste fluid or imported water at a given location

In doing

so, the likelihood is improved that the claim

Fourth, with fluid

depletion, the fluid may turn from the liquid to

attributes, are substantial.

However,

Only the least risk-

averse with rather large endowments of idle funds

this will probably only occur over a limited

could attempt to undertake production.

interval of extraction because severe depletion

*Some readers may consider this assumption insufficiently realistic.
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Finally,

although this seems a bit far-fetched, the legal

market to arrive at an efficient means of volun

view of competition may inhibit efforts to have

tary coordination of the various claimants' produc

each reservoir owned by a single claimant.

tion activities in a single geothermal reservoir.

All in

all, it seems highly likely that the result of gov

It will frequently be true that there will be a

ernment disposal of its proprietary rights will be

number of alternative outcomes for the coordinated

multiple claims in each reservoir.

activities, each of which is better than the status

The major

problem of the government, then, is to shape the

quo for one or more claimants but none of which is

claims it is to sell for each reservoir so that,

better for all claimants.

insofar as possible, the potential for reciprocal,

efforts to establish a framework for coordination

The results of voluntary

nonseparable externalities will not become actual.

thus depend on the extent to which a claimant can

It might be asserted by some that the initial

be induced to move from his most preferred posi

shape of the claims is really of no great impor

tion to a position that is more favorable to other

tance.

claimants.

According to this view, the courts, via

These final positions seem likely to

the adversary process, and the market, via merger

reflect the differences in bargaining endowments

and exchange of nonprice terms, will assure that

among the operators; that is, the shrewd, the bold,

an economically efficient claim shape will ulti

and the strong are more likely to obtain a basis

mately emerge,*

for coordination most favorable to their own inter

In the case of geothermal reser

voirs, this assertion is certainly arguable, if

ests.

not downright implausible.

ants whose claims provide them with structural

The strong will usually include those claim

advantages; that is their extraction of heat energy
As for the courts, they act in an ex post fashion.

will cause heat energy elsewhere in the reservoir

The decisions they arrive at are frequently

to migrate toward their well locations.

influenced by the economic mistakes already in
place, e.g., fixed investments of various sorts.

sound legal advice, "knowing the ropes" with a

They often lack technical expertise and are insti

state agency) may be distributed so the bargaining

tutionally limited in the alternatives they can
consider.

Moreover,

bargaining resource endowments (e.g., access to

outcome that will finally prevail is preordained.

Finally, the domain of concern in the

adversary process only indirectly extends beyond

A reluctance by the individual claimant to bargain

the domains of the litigating parties.

with his fellow claimants may, from his perspec
tive, be justified by a cost of disagreement that

One cannot be optimistic about the ability of the

could accrue by waiting to reopen the negotiations

*If, for example, the reservoir is being exploited under the rule of capture,
the following catalogue of inefficiencies will give the claimants the incentive
to mend their ways and the courts the incentive to intervene. Excessive quanti
ties of the valuable fluids are extracted in periods close to the present and
the marginal social costs of these fluids will exceed their prices. A race for
capture occurs implying that quantity supplied will be quite unresponsive to var
iations in price relative to a setting in which the activities of the various
claimants are coordinated. Given the relative price inelasticity of supply, mar
ket price fluctuations in response to demand shifts are more extreme. Develop
ment costs are raised because increases in the rate of extraction require a more
rapid rate of application of extraction inputs. Operating costs are increased
because the extraction of any given unit of fluid is not assigned to the lowest
marginal cost location within any single reservoir. An absence of cooperative
coordination in extractive activities does not provide the organizational base
or precedent for exploitation of scale economies in surface facilities and inhi
bition of environmental damages from subsidence, destruction of ground water,
and disposal of waste materials. Finally, this rather long catalogue of higher
expected costs and lower expected revenues discourages the search for new reser
voirs and thus ultimately reduces the inventory of known economic reserves.
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at some future date.* Opportunities may later

Perhaps the most important obstacle to arriving at

become available that would be foreclosed or made

an efficient level of coordination after the ini

much more costly to exploit by making a techni

tial conveyance of claims is the constraints

cally or legally irreversible commitment in the

imposed by the long-lived features of the already

present.

adopted production and administrative technology.

In addition, if the gains generated by

any coordination scheme can accrue to a particular

For example, geothermal heat energy, if used for

claimant only if the promises made by other claim

electricity production, heating, or cooling, must

ants are self-enforcing, the gains accruing to the

be used near the point of extraction.

individual claimant might appear highly problem

area for the heat energy is therefore rather

The market

atic; that is, the coordination effort may pose a

limited, possibly resulting in a very concentrated

high risk of failure and therefore have a rela

buyer's market.

tively low value productivity.

already entered into a contract with a monopsonist

If one heat energy producer has

utility to furnish the heat energy for electricity
Additional opportunities for strategic behavior in
any attempt to coordinate the activities of the
multiple claimants abound.

Most coordination

The claimant who desires coordination then

has no alternative claimant to whom he can turn if
a particular claimant declines to negotiate.

Each

claimant thus holds virtual monopoly power over
the supply of coordination efforts.

the contract, the heat energy producer is not
likely to share voluntarily his advantage with

schemes will require the adherence of all claim
ants.

generation, and if the utility's demand is met by

others, even though his wells may not, in terms of
the enthalpy of the fluid, be at the least-cost
locations.**

In effect, the positions from which

later bargaining is initiated are influenced by
the sunk investments.

Time paths of development

that are and would continue to be economically

*McDonald ^ ’ P' 2°°^notes that voluntary unitization in oil reservoirs typically
takes place only after substantial exploration and development have occurred.
**In the absence of voluntarily adopted coordination, many writers opt for com
pulsory "unitization" of the various claimants. Frequently the point is little
more than a semantic trick; multiple ownerships cause externalities in common
pools. By forming a single ownership or management, the externalities will, by
definition, be made internal. The relevant point is, of course, not internaliza
tion as such but the incentive internalization (unitization) can give to take
into account certain dimensions of interdependence among the set of claimants
that went unconsidered when the operators were acting autonomously. In order
for this Incentive to be operative, unitization must reduce the opportunities
for strategic behavior by individual operators and must produce increases in
total returns from the reservoir in excess of the costs of maintaining the uni
fied system. Unitization in the fluid reservoir literature appears to be synon
ymous to centralization in the economics of comparative systems literature.
McDonald (4, pp. I98-J.99) defines unitization as "the practice of unifying the
ownership and control of an actual or prospective oil or gas pool by the issuance
or assignment of units or undivided interests in the entire area with provision
(my emphasis) for development and operation by an agent. . .representing all
holders of individual interest therein." He distinguishes between two general
types of unitization agreement: a merger of title in leases in which each leasee
becomes a co-tenant of each tract in proportion to his ascribed interest in the
whole unitized area; and, a pooling of interests in production in which each
leasee retains full title to his lease, but title in production is pooled so that
each leasee shares in total returns and costs in proportion to the percentage
interest ascribed to his tract. The problem with McDonald's definition is that
he fails to be specific about the domain of decision variables included in the
"provision for development and operation." If one takes the definition literal
ly, a reservoir is unitized whenever a central manager acts with respect to any
variable whatsoever on behalf of the owners or operators. For a discussion of
the difficulties in giving analytical content to the notion of centralization,
see Koopmans and Montias(2).
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efficient prior to initial investment can be made

the operator to choose a mix and magnitude of in

technically impossible or economically inefficient

puts that minimizes the cost of extracting a given

by poor choices of initial investment strategies.

quantity of reservoir fluid, the appropriative
right is economically to be preferred to rights

3. THE CLAIM UNIT AND ITS SHAPE

defined in terms of the application of inputs,

Accepting the above arguments that the shaping of

given that more-or-less similar Informational

claims prior to government disposal of proprietary

costs are associated with the two alternative

rights will frequently lead to outcomes more eco

definitions.

nomically efficient than after-the-fact attempts
to patch up the system by perturbing already es

By giving each claimant the right to a definite

tablished positions, it remains to explain what

quantity of reservoir fluid, an appropriative

shape these claims might take.

rights system that permits all claimants to produce

Before devoting

simultaneously might at first glance appear to

attention to shape, however, one must decide the
unit it is that one is going to shape.

negate the nonseparability problem. In fact, it
does nothing of the sort, for the value of any

The units of analysis in terms of which claims

particular right continues to be dependent upon

are defined could conceivably be inputs applied to

the production activities of other claimants in

the reservoir, output from the reservoir, reser

the reservoir.

voir and fluid attributes, or some combination of
the preceding three.

rights system does serve to make the claim of any

Given the absence of a homo

single claimant easy to identify and verify.

geneous physical unit that permits practical mea

form of ownership and the scope of rights.

might be applied to geothermal reservoirs and fur

In

doing so, it reduces the costs of exchange and

ther given that technology for extracting the val

thereby improves the likelihood that a right will

uable fluids is unlikely to remain static, we will

ultimately be held by a claimant who finds it

dismiss the first alternative from serious consid

worthwhile to devote .the right to its highest-

This, however, does not mean that it

valued use.

will never be worthwhile to specify the quantities

It consequently increases, relative

to the rule of capture situation, the expected

of particular types of inputs to be applied in a
reservoir.

It

therefore reduces the costs of establishing the

surement of the variety of diverse inputs that

eration.

The adoption of an appropriative

value and thus the amount of investment in the

Adoption of claim specifications de

reservoir.

fined on inputs could occur because inputs are all

Basically, the adoption of an appro

priative rights system curbs the tendency of

that is sometimes readily susceptible to measure

claimants producing under the rule of capture to

ment and because the extent of their use is

treat the fluid remaining in the reservoir as a

thought to be related to more fundamental yet pos

zero-priced good.

sibly difficult to measure factors such as reser

However, the positive price

that it causes to be attached to some claims is

voir drive, fluid temperature, and the level of

strongly related to the production activities the

fluid extraction.

market expects of other claimants:

the cost of

The second or output-from-the-reservoir alterna

exploiting a particular right continues to be

tive is worthy of more serious consideration if

strongly dependent upon the actions of other claim

only because, under the guise of the appropriative

ants.

and correlative rights doctrines, it has so fre

absence of rights per se, are the major sources

quently been adopted for water.

of uncertainty about the stream of economic returns

In the case of a

If these other activities, rather than the

geothermal reservoir, a claim defined in terms of

to be had from exploiting a geothermal reservoir,

output might specify the amount of the fluid that
can be extracted at a particular location. If

the adoption of an appropriative rights system
alone cannot be expected to contribute greatly to

only because the appropriative right motivates

the economic efficiency of this exploitation.
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A sequential appropriation system in which junior

appropriator is increasing the junior appropria

appropriators are not guaranteed their quantities

tor 's marginal costs of exploiting his quota.

of the fluid until more senior appropriators have

The higher these costs, the less the juniors

exhausted their own quantities would effectively,

will produce during the current period and there

remove any nonseparabilities during the time peri

fore the less the extent the production activities

od in which claims are defined.

of the juniors will cause declines in such reser

Within the annual

period no claimant would have to account for the

voir attributes as pressure and temperature.

simultaneous production decisions of other claim

course, the greater are the values of these re

ants in order to establish the net-revenue-maxi

servoir attributes, the less the marginal cost

mizing level of his own production.

to the senior appropriator of producing his legal

A more senior

Of

appropriator need not be concerned about the pro

ly authorized quantity of output in the succeed

duction activities of more junior appropriators

ing period.

since the latter cannot produce until the former

tors

have exhausted their annual claims.

The ease with which senior appropria

can impose costs upon junior appropriators

implies that a junior right would have relatively

Similarly,

the history of senior appropriator production

little value in the market.

decisions would already be given the more junior

a sequential appropriative system would likely

appropriator.

result in one or only a very small number of

The cost to the junior appropriator

Strict adherence to

of extracting a given quantity of reservoir fluid

owner-operators in each geothermal reservoir.

would depend solely upon his own decisions.

complete reservoir unitization is thought to be

For

If

any individual appropriator, the state during the

desirable for reasons of economic efficiency (in

current production period of those economically

order to combat the problems of strategic behavior

relevant reservoir attributes such as temperature

among multiple owners), the adoption of a sequen

and pressure would, when he is actually producing,

tial appropriative system of rights to extract

be altered by no human activities other than his

fluid from the reservoir would do much to encour

own.

age unitization.

In effect, a system of sequential appropria

tive rights would negate all nonseparabilities in

If, for some reason, multiple ownerships and

the current period among claimants simply because

operations remain, one might lessen the force of

only a single claimant would be producing at any

the above point by assigning each right a unique

point in time.

and different time interval within any given time

Nevertheless, the above neither implies that more

period in which to produce.

senior appropriators would be unable to influence

period for which rights are assigned is a year,

Thus, if the time

the production activities of junior appropriators

the most senior appropriator's right might be

in the current period nor that nonseparabilities

operative only for the first week or month of the

would disappear across periods.

year.

Assume that oper

The next most senior appropriator would

then be the sole producer over the second time

ating costs are inversely related to the rate at
which a given volume of output is attained, i.e.,

interval within the year, and the most junior

that marginal operating costs increase with con

appropriator would be the last to produce.

The

tractions in the time interval over which a par

length of the intervals within the time period

ticular quantity of output is produced.

might be weighted by the quantity of production

Further

assume that senior appropriators are identical

permitted by the appropriate right.

from period to period.

gain, if any, in economic efficiency from such a

Under these circumstances

The net

the more senior appropriator would have an incen

scheme would be determined by the gain from

tive to make his last unit of legally authorized

doing away with nonseparabilities among owners'

production as close to the termination of the

and operators' decisions about production rela

period as possible.

tive to the costs that would accrue to each

In doing so, the senior
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owner and operator from an inability to produce

it will have a lesser degree of uncertainty and

legally on a continuous basis.

will therefore employ a lesser downward adjustment

In the case of

geothermal steam at least, there seems to exist

in his bid.

no severe technical problem in temporarily shut

bids of those who have operating experience will

ting down individual wells.*

tend to be higher.

Instead of predetermining the calendar interval

basis of the highest bid, this means that senior

over which a particular right will be exclusively

appropriators will tend to be similar from one

operative, one might accomplish the same objective

period to another.

This then means that, on average, the

If claims are awarded on the

In those instances where this

by reducing the likelihood of senior appropriators

is not true, the new operators might well have to

being identical from time period to period.

undergo the same or similar learning experiences

This

might be done, for example, by holding competitive

as the former operators.

auctions at the start of each period for the se

learning process involves an expenditure of

quential appropriative rights.

resources and to the extent that specialized

An intermittent

To the extent that the

knowledge about reservoir attributes is nontrans-

auction, however, would seem to have rather seri
ous economic disadvantages associated with it.

ferable or transferable only with expenditure of

Most importantly, it would cause present appro

real resources, the removal of the older operators

priators to be uncertain about the scope and the

generates an unequivocal social cost.

form of their future rights.

All of the preceding commentary implicitly assumes

To the extent that

legally unconstrained processes for extracting

that the quantity of fluid extracted from the

fluids from geothermal reservoirs involve long-

reservoir over a given time period is related in

lived investments, the introduction of uncertainty

a known or in a linear fashion to those economic

about future rights will reduce the expected re

ally relevant reservoir attributes such as tem

turns and therefore the magnitudes and time dura

perature and pressure.

tions of such investments.

between fluid quantity extracted and reservoir

Furthermore, it is

If the relationship

even possible that adoption of the auction will

pressure, for example, is known or is linear, it

defeat or at least fail to contribute to the very

is unnecessary to define claims in terms of any

purpose it is intended to serve.

thing other than the fluid quantity extracted or

In general,

those participants in the auctions who have not

some other measure of output.

yet held rights to exploit the reservoir in ques

given quantity at a particular location upon pres

tion will possess less knowledge about its attri

sure at another location would, cet. par., always

butes than those participants who have held and

be readily inferred by simple observation of the

continue to hold rights.

The relatively unknow-

relevant output quantity.

The effect of a

An individual claimant

ledgable participants will be aware that if they

would be able to assess the potential effects of

attempt to value their bids solely on the basis

the production activities of other operators upon

of their expectations about the stream of net

the values he faces of the economically relevant

returns from a claim, they will on occasion over

reservoir attributes by simply observing the out

bid and win the auction.

puts the rights of other claimants permit them.

They therefore adjust

their actual bids downward in proportion to their

Since these reservoir attributes are the media

degree of uncertainty about the economically rele

transmitting the effect of one claimant's produc

vant attributes of the reservoir.

A participant

tion activities upon those of another, definitions

who already has acquired some knowledge of the

of claims solely in terms of output would also

reservoir from his own operating experience with

define the uncompensated costs one claimant can

*See Budd^^for a commentary on the temporary shutting down of wells in the
Guysers steam field of California.
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legally Impose upon another.

However, when the

circumstances for each reservoir.

The costs of

relationship between output and reservoir attri

operating the attributes rights system could be met

butes is unknown and nonlinear, failure to define

without affecting marginal production decisions by

rights in terms of reservoir attributes may permit

charging a fixed absolute fee to each holder of

senior appropriators to transmit substantial un

rights.

compensated costs to junior appropriators.

the entire reservoir is thought to be relevant, de

For

Except insofar as the total output from

example, the pressure at other reservoir locations

fining rights in terms of attributes and output

might be sensitive in some unpredictable way to

would be redundant.

well spacing adopted by a particular operator.

A

rights that must be met would constrain the quan

right to produce defined only in terms of permis-

tity of output that could be produced.

sable output allows the parameter that is the

It should be noted that the problem of treating

medium through which the operator can impose costs
upon others to be treated as a free good.

replenishment of reservoir fluid is readily handled

That

by the attribute rights system.

is, given his output quota, the operator has no

ted pressure drops at various depths of the verti

process he adopts will affect the production op

cal extensions of the boundaries of a surface area.

The quantity of

The individual claimant would approach the recharge

output embodied in the appropriative rights will

against the benefits of the additional output he

be attained without regard to the effect upon the

could obtain by delaying his permitted drop in

reservoir attribute through which the externality
is actually transmitted.

One of the rele

vant attributes, for example, might be the permit

incentive to consider and weigh how the production

portunities of other operators.

The values of the attribute

pressure.

Adoption of a system of
The above discussion presumes that the behavior of

sequential appropriative rights defined solely in
terms of the exclusive right to produce from a

the economically relevant attributes of the reser

multiple owner reservoir over a finite calendar

voir is sufficiently well understood to permit def

period (or any other system of appropriative

inition of claims in terms of them.

rights defined solely in terms of output) would

assumed that all claimants have access to informa

mean that economically scarce reservoir attributes

tion with respect to the effect of each claimant's

would have zero prices attached.

activities upon reservoir attributes.

The consequences

It is further

In both

would be identical in character to the consequen

cases, claimant disclosure of acquired information

ces of treating any other economically scarce

on the behavior of reservoir attributes is implied.

resource as if it were free.

Since, however, the information acquired is inci

This problem can be

negated, however, by defining in multiple owner

dental to production activities and since it has

reservoirs sequential exclusive rights to produce

some of the characteristics of a public good, dis

over finite calendar periods in terms of permitted

closure requirements should work no hardship upon

changes at specific locations in economically

the claimant.

relevant reservoir attributes.

of information by an additional economic agent

The values of the

In particular, the use of a stock

does not reduce the size of the stock.

economically relevant reservoir attributes would

Thus no

sometimes cause welfare losses because they would

social cost is involved in providing other claim

not always correspond to the values that would be

ants and a central coordinating agency, if one

established in a negotiation process having a

exists, what would otherwise be private foreknow

close approximation to a competitive market.

ledge.

Any

Failures of the individual claimant to dis

choice between rights defined in terms of reser

close foreknowledge about reservoir conditions

voir attributes and the use of a negotiation pro

serve only to redistribute wealth from claimants

cess to establish values for these attributes

who lack information to the claimant who possesses

requires an empirical evaluation of the particular

it.

Such restrictions on the disposal of already

existing information do not serve to generate
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wealth; one claimant gains and the others lose,

the renewal option feature makes the position of

but there is no change in production opportuni
ties. *

the senior appropriator quite secure.

Information disclosure by existing claimants also

bias introduced with respect to capital investment

assists the government in determining the amount of

programs would be slight.

the resource to which it has not yet yielded pro

ed, the cost of interest totally dominates the cost

prietary rights.

of capital regardless of the length of the produc

In any case,

if the right duration is twenty years or more, any

Furthermore, it permits the gov

When decades are involv

ernment to shape future claims for disposal more

tion run to which the capital is to be devoted.

precisely and better enables it to ascertain the

passing acquaintance with tables of compount inter

actual market value of these claims.

est makes the point clear.

The informa

A

For example, the cash

tion disclosure requirement when combined with the

flow required to amortize a capital outlay in

attribute rights system makes it feasible and

twenty years at an eight percent rate of interest

even desirable to dispose of the rights in a se

is only slightly more than the flow needed to pay

quential and conservative fashion.

drilling of a well and production from it, addi

interest on it in perpetuity. In short, from the
perspective of a potential buyer of a right, it

tional information becomes available, making it

would not make much difference whether a twenty or

possible to shape subsequent rights in a manner

a sixty year right duration was employed.

that takes into account more dimensions of inter

if initial right specifications and quantities have

dependence among ultimate claimants.

caused inefficiencies, the twenty year duration

With each new

However,

provides an earlier, and therefore a more valuable,
If, as seems likely, the attributes and the behav

opportunity to undertake corrections.

ior of the reservoir are initially ill-known,
Economic arguments can also be found to justify

sound economic arguments exist for making the time
durations of the rights finite,* given that op

specifying the end-use to which the resource each

tions to renew the rights at the end of the dura

right represents will be put.

tion are rank-ordered according to the seniority

developer of the resource is best able to deter

ranking of the original right holders.

mine its most efficient use, the end-use to be

Basically,

On grounds that the

recognizing that a negotiation process among

specified in the right is that initially declared

claimants cannot be depended upon to correct past

by the developer.

mistakes, a finite duration for each right permits

duration, the end-use could be altered only with

the relevant government agency to acquire and to

mutual agreement between the developer and the

use new information about the reservoir in order

user, e.g., an electricity generating facility.

to correct previously unanticipated effects of

The arguments for the specification of end-use in

production nonseparabilities and to alter the rate

the property right have their rationale in the

of reservoir heat extraction in a manner enhancing

nontransportable nature of geothermal energy and

resource recovery.

the strong interdependence this nature introduces

If resource recovery calls for

Within the period of the right

reducing the rate of extraction, junior rights can

between developers and users of the resource.

be permitted to lapse upon their expiration.

particular, a specific user or users who agree to

Al

In

though finite duration for rights does make aged

buy the resource from a developer are agreeing to

capital appear to be progressively more attractive

buy a resource flow that has specific attributes

as one approaches the terminal date of the right

only at a specific site.

Once having made the

*The analysis underlying this argument is available in Marshall (3) and referen
ces therein.
**This feature is to be distinguished from the earlier discussion of giving a
claimant the exclusive right to produce during a relatively short calendar
period, e.g., a year.
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agreement, the developer no longer faces numerous
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This analysis has dealt with the trade-offs im
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plicit in various property right shapes in a com
mon pool where multiple owner production decisions
are nonseparable. The property rights structure
itself is seen as a variable of the decision prob
lem in managing the common pool that is the geo
thermal reservoir.

The problem has been viewed as

one of finding a set of obligations for developer
behavior that make each claimant's costs and re
wards less dependent on his joint relations with
other resource owners.

Likely and important con

tingencies defined in terms of reservoir attributes
are to be specified and appropriate responses are
to be stipulated.

Objective and measurable per

formance standards for permissible changes in
these reservoir attributes are to be formulated.
These standards may not always be consistent with
maximizing the value of joint output under condi
tions where the coupling of output responsibility
and rewards poses only trivial measurement prob
lems.
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Regularity, coherence, and predictability

about the behavior of all owners is nevertheless
Introduced to a greater degree than under the rule
of capture.
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